Common Sense Security

from http://www.publiceye.org/eyes/comsense.html

by Sheila O'Donnell

As our movements have become stronger and more sophisticated, the techniques of the state, corporations, and right-wing groups have also become more sophisticated. We have seen government agents, corporate security and right-wing intelligence networks share information as well as an ideology. For instance, the FBI's COINTELPRO operations targeted dissidents in America in the 1960s and 1970s. Caution and common sense security measures in the face of the concerted efforts to stop us are therefore both prudent and necessary.

Spend a few minutes to assess your work from a security point of view: understand your vulnerabilities; assess your allies and your adversaries as objectively as possible; do not underestimate the opposition. Try to assess your organizational and personal strengths and weaknesses. Do not take chances. Plan for the worst; work and hope for the best.

Here are some specific suggestions for protecting yourself and your projects:

Office

• Never leave the only copy of a document or list behind; take a minute to duplicate an important document and keep the duplicate in a safe place off-site.
• Keep mailing and donor lists and personal phone books out of sight. Always maintain a duplicate at a different location; update it frequently.
• Know your printer if you are about to publish and know your mailing house if you contract for distribution. The loss of camera-ready copy or a change in text could feel like a disaster.
• Back up and store important computer disks off-site. Sensitive data and membership lists should be kept under lock and key. Do not leave sensitive files on the hard disk; use floppies, back them up, and store the disks in secure spots. Use an encryption program to protect your data.
• Know the background of anyone you are trusting to work on any part of a project that is sensitive. Projects have been bungled because an untrustworthy person has purposefully intervened or inadvertently screwed up.
• Don't hire a stranger as a messenger. Your message might not arrive or could arrive after being duplicated for an unintended party.
• Sweeps for electronic surveillance are only effective for the time they are being done, and are only effective as they are being done if you are sure of the person(s) doing the sweep. Sweeps tend to be expensive because one must sweep a large area to be effective. Many experts contend that the most sophisticated federal government and private agency taps cannot be detected.
• Keep a camera handy at all times.

Trash

• What you consider trash could be a real treasure to someone looking for information about you or your projects. Don't throw information out in your trash. Garbology has become a tactic because it is so useful.
• Keep a "Burn file" in a secure place and occasionally burn it or use a shredder. Make sure you shredder creates confetti because strips can easily be reconstructed with a little patience.

Telephone

• Do not list your address with your phone number in the directories. Consider having yourself unlisted.
• If you receive threatening calls on your answering machine, immediately remove and save the tape.
• Never respond to a query over the telephone from an unknown person--lottery tickets, fabulous prizes, jury questionnaires, etc. notwithstanding. Ask for a telephone number and call the party back considerably later or the following day. Check the phone book to see if the phone number they gave you is legitimate. Check it out. Do the same if a reporter calls.
• Never say anything you don't want to hear repeated where there is any possibility of being recorded or overheard. Don't say anything on the phone you don't want to hear in open court.
• Don't talk in code on the telephone. If you are being tapped and the transcript is used against you in court, the coded conversation can be alleged to mean anything by government code "experts."
• Don't gossip about sensitive people or projects on the telephone. All information that can make an outsider "in the know" about you and your projects is valuable and makes everyone vulnerable.
• Keep a pad and pen next to the telephone. Jot down details of threatening or suspicious calls immediately. Note the time, date and keep a file.
• Don't waste time worrying about phone taps or imagining that strange clicks or hums or other noises indicate a phone tap. Many taps are virtually impossible to detect. Trust your instincts. If you think your phone is tapped, act accordingly.

Mail

• Get a mail box through the United States Post Office or a private concern. Be aware that the Post Office will give your street address to inquirers under certain circumstances.
• If you receive a threatening letter, handle it as little as possible. Put both the letter and the envelope in a plastic bag or file folder. Give the original to the police only if they agree to fingerprint it. If not, give them a copy because you may wish to have your own expert examine it.

Automobiles

• Keep your automobile clean so you can see if there is an addition or loss.
• Put no bumper stickers on your car which identify you as an organizer. Make your car look ordinary.
• Put your literature in the trunk or in a closed box.
• Keep your car locked at all times.

Police

• Report any incidents to the local police and ask for protection if you feel it is warranted.
• Report threats or harassment to your local police. Demand that they take a report and protect you if that is necessary. Talk to the press and report the police response as well as the incident(s).
• Report thefts of materials from your office or home to the police; these are criminal acts.

Under Surveillance?

• Brief your membership on known or suspected surveillance. Be scrupulous with documentation. Do not dismiss complaints as paranoia without careful investigation. The opposition can and frequently does have informants join organizations to learn about methods and strategy.
• Discuss incidents with colleagues, family, and membership. Call the press if you have information about surveillance or harassment. Discussion makes the secret dirty work of the intelligence agencies and private spies easier to spot.
• If you wish to have a private conversation, leave your home or office and take a walk or go somewhere very public and notice who can hear you.
• If you know a secret, keep it to yourself. As the World War II poster warned: loose lips sink ships.
• Photograph the person(s) following you or have a friend do so. Use caution. If someone is overtly following you or surveilling you, she or he is trying to frighten you. Openly photographing them makes them uncomfortable. If you are covertly being followed, have a friend covertly photograph them.
• If you are being followed, get the license plate number and state. Try to get a description of the driver and the car as well as passengers. Notice anything different about the car.
• If you are followed or feel threatened, call a friend; don't "tough it out" alone. "They" are trying to frighten you. It is frightening to have someone threatening your freedom.
• Debrief yourself immediately after each incident. Write details down: time, date, occasion, incident, characteristics of the person(s), impressions, anything odd about the situation.
• Keep a "Weirdo" file with detailed notes about unsettling situations and see if a pattern emerges.

Break-Ins

• Check with knowledgeable people in your area about alarm systems, dogs, surveillance cameras, motion sensitive lights, dead bolt locks, and traditional security measures to protect against break-ins.

Visits From the FBI

• Don't talk to the FBI or any government investigator without your attorney present. Get the names and addresses of the agents and tell them you will have your attorney contact them to set up a meeting. If you have an attorney, give her or him the name and phone number. Under any circumstance, get the agents' names and addresses. Information gleaned from a conversation can be used against you and your co-workers. The agents' report of even an innocuous conversation could "put words in your mouth" that you never uttered or your words could be distorted or made up if you don't have your attorney present.
• Call the National Lawyers Guild, American Civil Liberties Union, or other sympathetic legal organizations if you need assistance locating a reliable attorney in your area.
• The FBI rarely sets up interviews with counsel present. Often when the demand is made to have the interview with counsel, the FBI loses overt interest.
• Don't invite agents into your home. Speak with the agents outside. Once inside, they glean information about your perspective and lifestyle.
• Don't let agents threaten you or talk you into having a short, personal conversation without your lawyer. Don't let them intimidate or trick you into talking. If the FBI wants to empanel a Grand Jury, a private talk with you will not change the strategy of the FBI. Don't try to outwit the FBI; your arrogance could get you or others in serious trouble.
• FBI agents sometimes try to trick you into giving information "to help a friend." Don't fall for it; meet with the agents in the presence of your attorney and then you can help your friend.
• Lying to the FBI is a criminal act. The best way to avoid criminal charges is to say nothing.
• Any information you give the FBI can and will be used against you.
• Write for your government files under the Freedom of Information Act and keep writing to the agencies until they give you all the documents filed under your name.
• Don't let the agents intimidate you. What if they do know where you live or work and what you do? We have a constitutional right to lawful dissent. You are not required to speak with the FBI. They intend to frighten you; don't let them.
• Do not overlook the fact that government agencies sometimes share information within the government and with the private sector, particularly right-wing organizations. This has been documented.

Remember

Talk to colleagues and make yourself as secure as you can. Experts claim that people who resist get away from attackers more often than those who do not. The same logic applies to keeping outsiders out of your business; it is a more subtle form of attack.

Trust your instincts and resist when possible. One of the biggest blocks to resistance is the failure to recognize that we are under attack. None of this advice is intended to frighten but to create an awareness of the problems. A knowledge of the strategies and tactics of your adversaries will strengthen your movement. Cover yourself; it's a tough world out there.

Suggested Readings

Churchill, Ward and Jim Vander Wall. Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement. Boston: South End Press, 1988.

Donner, Frank J. The Age of Surveillance. New York: Random House, 1981.

Gelbspan, Ross. Break-ins, Death Threats and the FBI: The Covert War Against the Central America Movement. Boston: South End Press, 1991.

Glick, Brian. War at Home: Covert Action Against US Activists and What We can Do About It. Boston: South End Press, 1989.

Security Culture:
What is it, Why we need it and How to Implement it

from http://security.tao.ca/personal/culture.shtml

Luddites; liberationists; abolitionists; union organizers; revolutionaries... From large uprisings challenging the entire political structure, to isolated environmental and social struggles, people have constanly worked to create a better world. To government the response has always been to jail activists and revolutionaries using the courts and the police forces at hand.

As direct action movements become more effective, government surveillance and harassment will increase. To minimize the destructiveness of this political repression, it is imperative that we create a security culture within our movement.

This pamphlet is essential reading for anyone who is associated with groups that advocate and/or utilize sabotage, theft, arson and more militant tactics. The advice herein also applies to anyone who is associated with groups that practice civil disobedience, especially since membership often overlaps and gossip travels freely between groups.

Even if you have never picked up a monkeywrench or been arrested for civil disobedience, even if you think you have nothing to hide, these guidelines will enhance your personal safety as well as the movement¹s overall effectiveness. Surveillance has been set up on all sections of political movements in the past. Governments in the western industrialized world have targeted groups that have advocated sabotage and groups that have not, movements that have been militant and movements that have been markedly pacificst. The government¹s security machinery serves political and economic objectives, and there are over 250 political prisoners in Canada and the US that can testify to this from firsthand experience. By adoption a security culture, we can defeat various counterintelligence operations that would otherwise disrupt both mainstream organizing and underground resistance.

SO WHAT IS A SECURITY CULTURE?

It¹s a culture where the people know their rights and, more importantly, assert them. Those who belong to a security culture also know what behaviour compromises security and they are quick to educate those people who, out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or personal weakness, partake in insecure behaviour. This security consciousness becomes a culture when the group as a whole makes security violations socially and morally unacceptable in the group.

WHAT NOT TO SAY

To begin with, there are certain things that are inappropriate to discuss.

These things include:

• your involvement or someone else¹s involvement with an undergound group
• someone else¹s desire to get involved with such a group
• asking others if they are a member of an underground group
• your participation or someone else¹s participating in any action that was illegal
• someone else¹s advocacy for such actions
• your plans or someone else¹s plans for a future action

Can you see a pattern? What all of these are stating is this: it is wrong to speak about a specific individual's involvement (past, present or future) with illegal activities. These are unacceptable topics of discussion regardless of whether it is rumor, speculation or personal knowledge. Please note: no one is claiming it is wrong to speak about direct action in general terms. It is perfectly legal, secure and desirable that people speak out in support of mokeywrenching and all forms of resistance. The danger lies in linking individual activists to specific actions or groups.

THREE EXCEPTIONS

There are only three times that it is acceptable to speak about this information. The first situation would be if you were planning an action with other members of your small group (your ³cell² or ³affinity group²). However, you would never discuss these things over the Internet (email), phone line, through the mail, or in an activist's home or car, as these places and forms of communication are frequently monitored. The only people who should hear this discussion would include those who are actively partaking in the action. Anyone who is not involved does not need to know and, therefore, should not know.

The second exception occures after an activists has been arrested and brought to trial. If she is found guilty, this activist can freely speak of the actions for which she was convicted. However, she must never give information that would help the authorities determine who else participated in illegal activities.

The third exception is for anonymous letters and interview with the media. This must be done very carefully and without compromising security. Advice on secure communication techniques can be found in other publications.

Those are the only situations when it is appropriate to speak about your own or someone else's involvement or intent to commit illegal direct action.

SECURITY MEASURES

Veteran activists only allow a select few to know about their involvement with direct action groups. And those few consist of the cell members who they do the actions with AND NO ONE ELSE!

The reason for these security precautions is quite obvious: if people don't know anything, they can't talk about it. It also means that only the people who know the secret can also face jail time if the secret gets out. But when activists who do not share the same serious consequences knows who did an illegal direct action, they are far more likely to talk after being harassed and intimidated by the authorities, because they are not the ones who will go to jail. Even those people who are trustworthy can often be tricked by the authorities into revealing damaging and incriminating information. So it is safest for all cell members to keep their involvement in the group amongst themselves. The fewer people who know, the less evidence there is to bust them.

SECURITY VIOLATING BEHAVIOURS

In an attempts to impress others, activists may behave in ways that compromise security. Some people do this frequently - they are habitually gossiping and bragging. Some activists say inappropriate things only when they consume alcohol. Many activists make occasional breeches of security because there was a momentary temptation to say something or hint at something that shouldn¹t have been said or implied. In most every situation, the desire to be accepted is the root cause.

Those people who tend to be the greatest security risks are those activists who have low self-esteem and strongly desire the approval of their peers. Certainly it is natural to seek friendship and recognition for our efforts, but it is imperative that we keep these selfish desiresin-check so we do not jeopardize the safety of other activists or ourselves. People who place their desire for friendship over the importance of the cause can do serious damage to our security.

The following are examples of security-violating behaviours:

Lying: To impress others, liars claim to have done illegal actions. Such lies not only compromise the person's security--as cops will not take what is said as a lie--but also hinders movement solidarity and trust.

Gossiping: Some weak characters think they can winare privy to special information. These gossips will tell others about who did what action or, if they don't know who did it, guess at who they think did what actions or just spread rumors about who did it. This sort of talk is very damaging. People need to remember that rumors are all that are needed to instigate a grand jury.

Bragging: Some people who partake in illegal direct action might be tempted to brag about it to their friends. If someone did such a thing, it would not only jeopardize the bragger's security, but also that of the other people involved with the action (as they may be suspected by association), as well as the people who he told (they can become accessories after the fact). An activist who brags also sets a horrible example to other activists.

Indirect-Bragging: Indirect-braggers are people who make a big production on how they want to remain anonymous, avoid protests, and stay "underground." They might not come out and say that they do illegal direct action, but they make sure everyone within ear-shot knows they are up to something. They are no better than braggers, but they try to be more sophisticated about it by pretending to maintain "security." However, if they were serious about security, they would just make up a good excuse as to why they are not as active, or why they can't make it to the protest (that kind of lying is acceptable).

EDUCATE TO LIBERATE

With what we now know about security, it is easy to spot those activists who compromise our movement¹s security. So what do we do with people who exhibit these behaviours? Do we excommunicate them from our movement? Actually, no--at least, not for a first offense.

The unfortunate truth is there are numerous security-ignorant people in the movement and others who have possibly been raised in a "scene" that thrives on bragging and gossiping. It doesn't mean these people are bad, but it does mean they need to be educated. Even seasoned activists can make mistakes when there is a general lack of security consciousness inour gruops. And that¹s where those of you who are reading this can help. We must NEVER let a breach in security occur without acting to correct it. If an acquaintance of yours is bragging about doing an action or spreading security-compromising gossip, it is your responsibility to explain to her or him why that sort of talk violates security and is inappropriate.

You should strive to educate this person in a manner that encourages him to listen and to change his behaviour. It should be done without damaging his pride. You should be humble and sincerely interested in helping him to become a better person and a more effective activists. Do not maintain a "holier than-thou" attitude. This attitude will inevitably raise his defenses and prevent him from absorbing or using any of the advice you offer. Remember, the goal of educating people is to change their behavior, not boost your ego by showing them how much more security-conscious you are.

If possible the educational session be done in private, so the person does not have to contend with the humiliation of a public reprimand. The educational reprimand should also be done as soon as possible after the mistake to increase its effectiveness.

If each of us takes on the responsibility of educating those who slip up, we can dramatically improve movement security. Once people recognize lying, gossiping, bragging, and indirect-bragging as the damaging character-flaws that they are, they will soon end. When we develop a culture where all breaches of security result in an immediate reprimand, all sincere activists will quickly get with the program.

DEALING WITH CHRONIC SECURITY PROBLEMS

So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security precautions even after multiple educational sessions? It's unfortunate, but the best thing to do with these people is cut them loose and kick them out of our meetings, basecamps and organizations. With law enforcement budgets on the increase and with courts handing down long sentences for political ³crimes², the stakes are too high to allow chronic security-offenders to work among us.

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